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Publication of the Ramses report by the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI - Institut français des relations internationales)

Paris, 20 September 2007

(...) EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY

As regards the treaty and the Intergovernmental Conference, the Portuguese presidency has prepared a draft treaty in barely a month. This modifies the existing treaties, adapting them case by case, taking on board all the agreed institutional changes, particularly the stable presidency, extension of qualified majority voting and facilitation of enhanced cooperation.
Except for the scale of the modernization of the institutional machinery, necessary to adapt the decision-making processes to the virtual doubling of the number of EU members, this treaty differs little from the preceding Nice and Amsterdam Treaties.

It’s clearly an amending treaty, which we shall soon be submitting for your ratification. I note, moreover, that the countries which had asked for legal guarantees in this sphere - in particular the Netherlands, who, with respect to the conclusions on the amending nature of the treaty, has, I understand, received some positive advice from her Council of State.

For three weeks, our legal experts have been going through this draft with a fine-tooth comb, so that no ambiguity remains. It is still being looked at from the technical point of view so that the draft can be ready to be submitted for the political agreement of the heads of State and government at the Council in Lisbon, the informal summit on 18 and 19 October.
We hope to have confirmation there of the political agreement. I note, moreover, that at the last informal foreign ministers’ Council, at the beginning of September in Portugal, few issues were referred back up to the political level.

As you know, the main problem lies in the fact that we have the Polish election two days before the European Council. Poland has made demands particularly regarding the Ioannina compromise in the treaty. But the other 26 partners have rejected this demand. It had already been negotiated in June. We hope and we’ll try and ensure that our Polish friends can find a reasonable way out on this matter.
On other points, particularly regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights, they have become more reasonable and no longer wish to rule out applying the whole of it.
The prospects for agreement seem to me fairly good and we are optimistic, with the Portuguese presidency, about reaching an agreement at the next Council of Heads of State and Government. (...)

EUROGROUP/PILLAR STRUCTURE/GLOBAL PLAYER

This treaty won’t be without consequences for the EU’s role in the world. I’m thinking of the institutionalization of the Eurogroup which will allow the European Union to gain political advantage from the euro’s success. (...) I’m also thinking of the abolition of the pillar structure, while maintaining the ESDP as a specific policy.

It is in the new institutional framework that Europe, this is our second firm belief, is asserting its role as a global player.
The European Union has reached a stage of maturity allowing it to become a global power, with a large range of instruments.

ESDP

The first is the ESDP. It’s a success. Significant progress has been achieved since the Saint-Malo declaration and the EU has conducted 15 operations under the ESDP.
The ESDP includes the structures progressively put into place since 1999, the military and civilian capabilities constituted on the basis of headline goals and the operations (15 conducted to date, including four military ones on all continents).

Today, the challenge is to use the available instruments and conduct operations, which are becoming increasingly complex because of people’s expectations of the European Union.

From the first operations conducted under the ESDP we have learned lessons allowing us to go further. As regards the operations, relations between the European Union and NATO have been good : two of the ESDP military operations were conducted with NATO assets, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM in the so-called "Berlin plus" framework. This shows there is no rivalry and that the two approaches are complementary. This is the firm belief of all the partners and those operating in the framework of this policy. Relying realistically, pragmatically on the one in order to strengthen the other is our objective defined by President Sarkozy, which presupposes a dialogue with our American partners.

The alternative system to having recourse to NATO assets, i.e. having a "lead nation", has also proved beneficial: the same applies to Germany’s participation in the operations in the Congo in 2006 and we hope, regarding the crisis in Darfur and its extension into east Chad, to have the support of several European partners. This is what we are in the process of negotiating at the moment, of course under United Nations auspices.

This system has also shown its limits, which is why we would like it strengthened. This will be one of the French presidency’s priorities. We shall have to go further by activating a permanent operational planning and control centre in Brussels.

Clearly, this is an extremely important field where significant progress is required since it addresses a need, an expectation on the part of the general public in an increasingly complex and unstable world. It is now, and I welcome this, fully legitimate for the EU to operate and develop this European policy, once good coordination with NATO has been achieved. (...)

EU REGULATORY INFLUENCE/SOFT POWER

The success of the EU gives it credibility and increased influence in the world since it is by nature a “legislative power” founded on democracy and respect for fundamental values.

It is founded on the primordial role of the law. The EU is above all "a rule-making power" which helps give it important weight in a world we want founded on multilateralism.
The way the European Union operates gives it legitimacy, something which is arousing interest among our partners ; for example, China may be more sensitive to European positions, more balanced given the EU’s diversity, than to the more unilateral American positions on the environment, trade or the fight against counterfeiting.

ENLARGEMENT/MEDITERRANEAN UNION

(...) We need to manage the European Union’s pull factor vis-à-vis its neighbours. The first consequence of this is enlargement. The movement was obvious for Central and Baltic Europe ; it is equally natural today for the Western Balkan countries, with, however, the necessity for these countries to get on with each other, resolve the conflicts and fight organized crime. Nevertheless, enlargement can’t be the only way to ensure the stability of our neighbourhood.

The question now is to know what we can do vis-à-vis the European Union’s neighbours without being constrained by having to make a choice between agreeing to and rejecting their accession.

The neighbourhood policy is a first response. But the challenge is to differentiate, favouring the most dynamic neighbours - I’m thinking of Morocco in the south, Ukraine in the east - and promote regional cooperation between neighbouring States. This isn’t always easy. We’ve got to encourage a number of our neighbours to forge cooperation projects with each other - I’m thinking of the countries within the Maghreb and those in the Caucasus.

It is an extremely weighty task, it is the purpose of the Mediterranean Union project we have launched. It is about having, with the Mediterranean countries - for us the second solidarity area after Europe - a union modelled on the way the European Community was built in the 1950s, which can develop de facto solidarities and concrete cooperation projects which are primarily of interest to the EU countries. I’m thinking of maritime safety, the environment, clean water, security issues, demographic trends and economic development.
This is encouraging us to go beyond the existing Euro-Mediterranean partnership and give it fresh impetus and a new higher political profile, whilst ensuring that the instruments which have proved effective can go on being used and that, in a way which we shall have to define together, we can involve all our European partners in this extremely exciting and essential venture.

The Mediterranean is the only area in the world not benefiting from any regional integration or any cooperation network. Every other area has more firmly established cooperation projects than this area. Yet this area is where all the unrest and hotbeds of tension are concentrated. (...)